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ABSTRACT
The technological and electoral landscapes have changed
drastically since the turn of the century. While it once might have
made sense to view voting online as unconstitutional, as opposed to
merely impractical, the expanded range of Internet access for
minority communities has made that argument tenuous at best.
While there still may exist practical and political reasons to avoid
Internet voting, the Constitution no longer stands as an effective
wall against the practice. Furthermore, the primary statutory
obstacle to the implementation of Internet voting on a local level,
the Voting Rights Act, has been greatly weakened by the recent
Supreme Court decision in Shelby County. As such, now is the
perfect time for state-level experimentation in the field of Internet
voting.

INTRODUCTION
Voting in the United States overwhelmingly takes place at physical
polling locations where voters assemble, in person, to choose their leaders
and representatives. Some states, however, have moved away from the
prototypical election structure by introducing alternative means for voters to
cast their ballots. All states do this to a minor extent through mail-in
absentee voting,1 but some have gone even further to allow so-called “onestop” absentee voting.2 The process of one-stop voting is remarkably similar
to traditional Election-Day voting, but the legal structure surrounding the
casting of the ballots is entirely different. In North Carolina, for example,
one-stop voting is viewed more similarly to mail-in absentee voting than it
is to Election-Day voting—this is why the number and operational hours of
†
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1
See, e.g., N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, STATE ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST
FORM (2013), available at http://www.ncsbe.gov/ncsbe/Portals/0/FilesP/AbsBallot
ReqFormv112013.pdf.
2
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-227.2 (2013) (describing and mandating the
process for “one-stop” voting in North Carolina).
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polling places do not need to be uniform throughout the state.3 Other states,
such as Washington, have completely eliminated Election-Day voting,
replacing it with mail-in ballots for every qualified voter.4 Rather than
assembling at a single location on Election Day, or even over a series of
days as with North Carolina’s one-stop system, Washington voters are able
to make their decisions at their leisure and without the pressure of timeconstraints or the worry of being bullied or harassed by others.5 A voter in
Washington has approximately eighteen days in which to vote, and every
voter has an equal opportunity to do so.6
Internet voting takes the idea of one-stop absentee voting and
universal mail-in voting a step further. Rather than relying on the archaic
systems of physical presence and physically-transported paper documents,
both of which are time-consuming and costly, Internet voting relies on the
most efficient communications network ever designed. Voters in a state that
had instituted Internet voting would be able to have the same sort of
unhurried and thoughtful decision-making opportunity as Washington
voters currently enjoy; and election officials would be able to avoid much of
the hassle of printing, distributing, collecting, and tabulating paper ballots.7
But Internet voting arguably faces three major hurdles before it
could be implemented. First, one must consider whether or not Internet
voting is constitutional. The Constitution of course does not discuss Internet
voting in as many words, but the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
of poll taxes may stand in the way of a state trying to implement Internet
voting. Second, the Voting Rights Act8 might prohibit a state or locality
from implementing Internet voting. While Section Four of the Voting
3

See id. § 163-227.2(g) (requiring uniformity within a particular county, but
remaining silent on state uniformity).
4
See Vote by Mail, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE: ELECTIONS & VOTING,
https://wei.sos.wa.gov/agency/osos/en/voters/Pages/vote_by_mail.aspx (last visited
Apr. 13, 2014) (“Washington State votes by mail.”).
5
See id. (“Vote by mail is convenient and gives you extra time to learn about the
ballot measures and candidates before casting your vote.”).
6
See id. (explaining that ballots are distributed at least eighteen days before an
election and must be returned or postmarked by Election Day).
7
Although this author believes that mandatory voting is unlikely to be a reality in
the near future, President Obama’s recent statements indicating his support of
mandatory voting make this an especially beneficial outcome of Internet voting. See
Holly Yan, Obama: Maybe It’s Time for Mandatory Voting, CNN (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/19/politics/obama-mandatory-voting/ (describing
President Obama’s stance). The costs savings from eliminating all paper
requirements for approximately 250 million ballots would be far greater than
eliminating those for the smaller percentage of that number that currently vote.
8
52 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101–10702 (West Supp. 2014) (originally codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2012)).
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Rights Act was recently struck down as unconstitutional in Shelby County v.
Holder,9 Section Two, which allows for suits brought after a denial of equal
access to voting, remains. Furthermore, Section Five, requiring preclearance
of election law changes for certain areas of the country, also could prevent
the implementation of Internet voting, but that would require a new
coverage formula to be developed to replace Section Four.
Finally, there are practical and political concerns with Internet
voting. Chief among these is the very real possibility that the system could
be hacked, crashed, or otherwise rendered inoperable or untrustworthy, as
well as doubts over the political feasibility of passing legislation
implementing Internet voting. Concerns over trustworthiness have been
leveled against electronic voting machines at in-person voting locations,10
and at least in some instances technical errors have actually led to
inaccurate results.11 Additionally, the recent failed rollout of healthcare.gov
raises serious concerns about whether or not the government can effectively
manage a large online system like would be required here. 12
This Issue Brief will focus on the first and second of these issues.
While practical and political concerns are important for any serious
proponent of Internet voting to confront, the purpose of this Brief is simply
to argue that there is no legal barrier to Internet voting. Whether or not
Internet voting is a good idea, or one which would even be feasible, is
outside the scope of this Brief.

I. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROHIBIT INTERNET VOTING
The most fundamental obstacle to Internet voting, as with any
change in law, is the United States Constitution.13 But despite what others
have argued,14 Internet voting would not violate the Twenty-Fourth
9

133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
Editorial: Electronic Voting Is the Real Threat to Elections, USA TODAY (Sep.
19, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/story/2012-0919/electronic-voting-fraud-security/57809062/1.
11
Zachary Roth, Machine Turns Vote for Obama into One for Romney, MSNBC
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/politicsnation/machine-turns-vote-obamaone-rom.
12
See Shoshanna Weissmann, Why Healthcare.gov Failed in One Flow Chart,
POLICYMIC (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/articles/75683/whyhealthcare-gov-failed-in-one-flow-chart (“While appalling and inexcusable,
healthcare.gov’s failures are part of the larger norm of failing governmental
technology initiatives.”).
13
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14
Brett Stohs, Is I-Voting I-Llegal?, 2003 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0013 ¶ 13 & n.25.
This article was published while Professor Stohs was a student at Duke University
and may or may not reflect his current scholarly views. Professor Stohs’s
10
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Amendment or any other constitutional provision. Professor Brett Stohs
believes it would, although his argument is not fully developed.15 The
purpose of this section is to explain and counter that claim. While an
incredibly strict understanding and implementation of Internet voting would
admittedly push up against the constitutional line, a well-designed system
could avoid the constitutional challenge.16

A. How a Strict Implementation of Internet Voting Would Run Afoul
of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment states:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or
other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President
or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason
of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.17

This absolute right to vote without paying a tax also applies to the
election of state officials.18 In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,
the Supreme Court held that “a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or
payment of any fee an electoral standard.”19
From the text of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the holding of
Harper, it is clear that any payment or wealth status required to be eligible
to vote is unconstitutional. Thus, if Internet voting were to fall under this
category, it would be unconstitutional.

conclusions may also have been correct at the time of his writing, but modern
trends have called his arguments into doubt. While both of these considerations are
important to bear in mind, the argument presented in Is I-Voting I-Llegal? serves as
a useful launching point for the argument presented here, especially considering the
relative dearth of scholarship on this topic.
15
See id. ¶ 13 (stating simply: “[a]t present, such a scheme would certainly violate
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.”).
16
There may of course be other elements of an Internet voting system that would
render it unconstitutional, but those have little to do with the Internet element
explored here. For example, one could conceive of an Internet voting system that
would violate one-person-one-vote or some other constitutional voting requirement.
Such a system would be unconstitutional, but not because it is online. The claim
made throughout, that Internet voting is constitutional, should therefore be viewed
as a more concise phrasing of the idea that voting over the Internet does not present
any constitutional challenges unique to that method.
17
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
18
383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
19
Id. at 666.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

185

Internet voting would almost certainly count as a wealth status
requirement for voting if individual Internet access was absolutely required
in order to vote. Paying for an Internet connection of any form—highspeed, dial-up, even mobile—requires some non-zero amount of disposable
income.20 While this payment would not necessarily be made to the
government (and therefore might not properly be characterized as a tax), it
would seem to fit under Harper’s prohibition of making the “affluence of
the voter . . . an electoral standard.”21
However, any way around paying for a personal Internet connection
would weaken the argument that Internet voting requires a certain level of
affluence. Therefore, in order to be clearly unconstitutional, a scheme of
Internet voting would have to require individually purchased or controlled
Internet access that has a non-zero cost. The availability of free Internet
access would negate the constitutional challenge.
Internet voting would therefore be prohibited by the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment only if it were to be implemented in an extremely strict
manner: the only way one can vote is by Internet, and the only Internet
connection one can use is one that the individual pays for in some way.
Such a system would be more extreme than the similar Washington state
system, because that allows for returns of ballots by hand rather than by any
means requiring payment.

B. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment Does Not Prohibit Internet Voting
While the preceding section described how Internet voting could
possibly violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, it is unlikely that any
scheme developed would actually do so. Remember that two criteria must
exist for Internet voting to be unconstitutional:
1. Internet voting must be the only method of voting
available.
2. The only Internet connection one can use to vote is one
that the individual pays for, either through purchase or
rent.
Because the primary purpose of this section is to argue against the
claim put forward by Professor Stohs in his article, which itself was limited
to situations where Internet voting was the only available method of
voting,22 this Brief will assume the truth of the first criterion. If Internet
20

See, e.g., Dial-Up Internet Plans, NETZERO, http://www.netzero.net/dialup (last
visited Apr. 13, 2014) (offering “Basic Dial-Up” Internet service for $9.95 per
month).
21
Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
22
Stohs, supra note 14.
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voting were simply implemented as an additional method of voting,
alongside traditional Election-Day physical voting, there would be no issue.
But, while this Brief will accept the first criterion, and in fact the author
would actually prefer this criterion to be met for the sake of simplicity in the
system, it is worth noting what this criterion does not require.
Internet voting could be the only method of voting available in two
possible ways. The first would be if there were no way to walk, drive, or
ride to any other location, such as to the Board of Elections or similar
governmental organization, to cast a vote in person. This is the obvious
inference one could draw from the concept of Internet voting. But
remember that Internet voting is useful for two broad reasons:
1. Internet voting is more convenient for the voter.
2. Internet voting is more convenient for election
officials.
A system designed so that some individuals could vote from home
on their computers and others could vote from a centralized polling location
might therefore seem to simply be the either-or, additional-method, system
dismissed earlier. But if the centralized locations are tied into the same
system as the cast-from-home online votes are (for example, if the
centralized location used the same website as was available from home,
rather than a different website that then required data to be moved over),
then the benefits to the election officials still manifest, even if there is no
added convenience for any particular voter.
These benefits to election officials should be viewed relative to the
present system. Setting up a centralized location for voting would lower the
total cost of administering an election.23 This is because fewer centralized
locations would be required than are needed for mandatory in-person
voting. When that benefit is viewed alongside the savings in tabulation
costs because of the automated nature of the online system, the end result is
a large increase in both convenience and efficiency for the election officials.
A key aspect of this system would be that the voter at the
centralized location would be using the same interface as someone voting
from home. Their votes would not be differentiated in any way, except for
perhaps by IP address (but only if the IP address were tracked for every
voter, which would raise its own issues related to voter privacy).
23

See Benefits of the Vote Center Model, LARIMER COUNTY,
http://www.co.larimer.co.us/elections/votecenter/votecenters_benefits.htm (last
visited Apr. 13, 2014) (noting that there are “cost savings in many areas including
requiring fewer election workers and fewer election supplies” from establishing
Vote Centers, larger and more centralizing voting locations distinct from traditional
precincts).
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What this centralized location would amount to, then, would be a
glorified Internet café with only one website available. But the key
criterion—that Internet voting be the only voting available—would still be
met.
This second way of looking at the first criterion, that a centralized
location does not negate it because the practical benefits for the election
officials still exist, leads directly into solving the problem implicated by the
second criterion. Because this Brief accepts the premise that Internet voting
is the only form of voting in this hypothetical scenario, if voting cannot be
performed for free, then the entire scheme is unconstitutional.24 Even
Washington has apparently recognized this fact in allowing their mailed
ballots to be hand-returned, rather than requiring the purchase of a stamp.25
But, as described above, establishing a central location from which
people can vote using the online system does not make Internet voting any
less universal. So long as this centralized location is free to use, the second
criterion is not met and Internet voting is constitutional (at least as far as the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment is concerned).
Even if, however, a particular state decided not to have a free, staterun election location from which voters without personal Internet
connections could vote, an Internet voting scheme might still be able to
survive a constitutional attack. Public libraries offer Internet access on their
computers for free.26 Many locations, such as coffee shops, offer free
Internet access so long as an individual uses their own device.27 And others,
such as big-box stores, might be able to convert their existing public
computers (demonstration floor models, employment application terminals,
and the like) to allow access to a voting website, especially if there is some
governmentally-provided incentive for doing so.
Some of these options, such as libraries or incentivized big-box
stores, are absolutely free for the voter. Others, such as coffee shops, require
some level of personal wealth, but in a more abstract context with which we
are already familiar, like requiring a small purchase to remain in the space.
While owning an Internet-capable device might require being affluent, it is
24

See supra Part I.A.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE: ELECTIONS & VOTING, supra note 4.
26
See, e.g., Acceptable Use of the Internet and Library Public Computers,
MULTNOMAH COUNTY LIBRARY, https://multcolib.org/policies-manuals/
acceptable-use-internet-and-library-public-computers (last modified Feb. 6, 2012)
(“A visitor who does not have a library card may receive an Internet guest pass by
signing up and showing current, valid photo identification.”).
27
See, e.g., Wi-Fi (United States), STARBUCKS, http://www.starbucks.com/
coffeehouse/wireless-internet (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (“Starbucks offers free,
one-click, unlimited Wi-Fi at all company-owned stores in the United States . . . .”).
25
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important to keep in mind, too, that despite the exact wording of Harper,
some level of wealth is required to vote under the current system—
transportation to the voting location will not necessarily be free.28
Thus, there are a number of free options available for voters in an
Internet voting regime. These options range from completely government
funded and operated centralized locations such as public libraries to
government- or market-incentivized private businesses. Additionally,
Internet access is available for free provided the voter already owns or can
obtain an Internet-accessible device (similar to the current requirement that
the voter owns or can obtain a means of transportation to the physical polls)
at a number of locations that may be easier to access than a public library.
Because these options would be available under an Internet voting
scheme, the second criterion of unconstitutionality is not met. Internet
voting could be implemented without running up against the prohibition on
poll taxes in the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.

II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT DOES NOT PROHIBIT INTERNET
VOTING
Clearing the constitutional hurdle of the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment is not enough, on its own, to make Internet voting legal.
Internet voting must, in addition to being available at no charge to voters,
avoid running afoul of the statutory prohibitions on election laws
established in the Voting Rights Act.29 The Voting Rights Act deals with
racial discrimination in voting, and has two main operative sections that will
be discussed in this Brief. The first is Section Two, which makes it illegal
for a state to dilute the vote of a racial group or to deny equal access to
voting to a specific racial group.30 The second is Section Five, which
requires certain jurisdictions to clear any changes in election law with the
Department of Justice before those changes take effect.31 However, as this
Brief will explain in more detail below, neither of these sections would
serve as much of a barrier against Internet voting today, even though they
would have just a short time ago.
28

See USA National Gas Price Heat Map, GASBUDDY.COM, http://www.gasbuddy.
com/gb_gastemperaturemap.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (displaying current gas
prices throughout the country, with many locations having an average price of over
$2.08 per gallon).
29
52 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101–10702 (West Supp. 2014) (originally codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2012)).
30
Id. § 10301; see also Voting Rights Act, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/voting_rights_act (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (explaining the votedilution aspect of Section Two).
31
52 U.S.C.A. § 10304 (West Supp. 2014); see also LEGAL INFO. INST., supra note
30 (explaining how Section Five operates).
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A. Section Two Does Not Prohibit Internet Voting
Whether or not Section Two of the Voting Rights Act prohibits
Internet voting depends on whether or not the vote of a specific racial group
is diluted and whether or not a specific racial group is denied equal access
to voting. Neither of these, however, is true of Internet voting.
1. Internet voting does not dilute the voting power of any racial group
In order for a challenge under Section Two of the Voting Rights
Act to succeed on vote dilution grounds, the plaintiffs must show that three
elements have been met:
1. “[T]he minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district”32
2. “[T]he minority group must be able to show that it is politically
cohesive.”33 That is, members of the minority racial group must
vote similarly to one another, so that they can be said to have a
preferred group candidate. Additionally, members of the white
majority must vote similarly to one another, so that their
candidate usually defeats the minority’s candidate.34
3. The challenged procedure must have racially discriminatory
effects when viewed under the totality of the circumstances.35
It is highly unlikely that these three elements would be able to be
proven about an Internet voting procedure. Internet voting does not affect
the organization of districts, which makes the first two elements incredibly
difficult to prove. Even if they could be proven, however, showing that
Internet voting has racially discriminatory effects would be difficult.
2. Internet voting does not deny any racial group equal access to voting
Similarly, Internet voting does not deny any racial group equal
access to voting. At its core, this test under Section Two makes Internet
voting illegal if a racial group’s “members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.”36 This test is one of results, not of intent; a
discriminatory effect is enough to render Internet voting illegal even if it

32

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
Id. at 51.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 46; see also Stohs, supra note 14, ¶ 18.
36
52 U.S.C.A. § 10301 (West Supp. 2014).
33
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was not implemented with the intent to discriminate.37 However, as detailed
below, the data does not support the claim that Internet voting would deny
any racial group equal access to voting.
The question here is whether or not Internet voting would have a
discriminatory effect on any protected class of citizens. The answer to that
question is no, for two reasons. First, because of the ability for individuals
to still vote, as usual, at outside-the-home physical locations; and second,
because the racial digital divide is shrinking incredibly fast and should no
longer generate the same amount of concern it once did.
The first of these reasons has already been addressed.38 Outside-ofthe-home physical locations could be made available for individuals, and
doing so would be at least as effective as the current system requiring inperson voting. If an individual cannot make it to the latter location, they
would be similarly unable to make it to the former, and vice-versa.
But looking beyond the basic nature of these locations, the money
saved by a switch to Internet voting (by removing the need to have as many
in-person locations open39) can be redirected to having more voter outreach
and voting locations for racial groups who may be disproportionately
affected by the switch. In fact, if that transition were to occur, it would
likely actually increase the percentage of racial minorities who vote, rather
than decrease it. Racial groups with Internet access would see an increase
due to convenience, but so would racial minorities without Internet access.
The second reason itself can be looked at from two perspectives:
current statistics and trend lines toward the future. Simply looking at current
statistics, there may exist some level of concern about discriminatory racial
effects from a transition to Internet voting. But when one looks at where the
lines are pointing and what is likely to occur by the time any government
makes a full transition, the discriminatory effects are likely to be highly
mitigated, if not eliminated.
For example, in 2012, a larger percentage of Hispanic and black
individuals owned smartphones than did white individuals.40 And looking at
37

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35 (noting that Congress revised Section Two “to make
clear that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone”).
38
See supra Part I.B.
39
See LARIMER COUNTY, supra note 23 (noting that there are “cost savings in many
areas including requiring fewer election workers and fewer election supplies” from
establishing Vote Centers, larger and more centralizing voting locations distinct
from traditional precincts).
40
Mark Hugo Lopez, et al., Closing the Digital Divide: Latinos and Technology
Adoption, PEWRESEARCHCENTER HISPANIC TRENDS PROJECT (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/03/07/closing-the-digital-divide-latinos-andtechnology-adoption/.
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who goes online from a mobile device, Hispanic and black individuals far
surpass white individuals: seventy-six percent for Hispanic individuals,
seventy-three percent for black individuals, and sixty percent for white
individuals.41 Overall, white individuals use the Internet more often than
black or Hispanic individuals, but the latter groups still use the Internet far
more often than not: seventy-eight percent of both groups answer
affirmatively to questions about basic Internet usage.42
Looking beyond the simple statistics, the trend seems to be moving
toward members of racial minorities having greater access to smartphones
and home Internet than white individuals. “Although disparities in Internet
use for households persisted across race and Hispanic origin groups in 2011,
they appear to be shrinking.”43 While the difference in how racial groups
access the Internet may persist, long-term demographic shifts will likely
lead to increased smartphone use across racial lines.44
This data does not necessarily point towards there being no Section
Two problem with Internet voting if it were somehow implemented swiftly
and immediately. But the world is certainly better off than it was in 2003,
when only 61.8 percent of the overall population had a computer in the
home,45 and the racial divide appears to be closing. If Internet voting were
phased in over a five-year period, these numbers would likely have
converged much more closely and made the racially discriminatory effects
claim far less likely to succeed.
Age also plays a role in election discrimination, although it is not
explicitly contemplated by the Voting Rights Act. America is moving in the
direction of becoming a majority-minority country, with minority birth rates
outnumbering white birth rates.46 One implication of this is that younger
41

Id.
Id. White individuals answer with an eighty-seven percent affirmative to the
same questions. Id.
43
Census Bureau Report Details Rising Internet Use and Shows Impact of
Smartphones on Digital Divide, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 10, 2013),
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2013/cb13-111.html.
44
See Will Oremus, New Digital Divide: Whites Less Likely to Own Smartphones,
SLATE (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/08/07/
digital_divide_minorities_more_likely_than_whites_to_own_smartphones.html
(noting both that the elderly are less likely than the young to use smartphones,
which would mean that smartphone use should increase over time, and that white
individuals are less likely than other major ethnic groups to use smartphones).
45
THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED
STATES: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 1 (2013), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-569.pdf.
46
Jeffrey S. Passel, et al., Explaining Why Minority Births Now Outnumber White
Births, PEWRESEARCHCENTER SOCIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (May 17, 2012),
42
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voters are more likely to be racial minorities than older voters. Current
voting trends arguably make it more difficult for these younger voters,
especially those who are members of racial minorities, to vote.47
Internet voting could be the solution to this problem. Current voting
laws have a disparate impact on racial minorities because they prevent
young, and therefore disproportionately minority, individuals from voting.
However, these young individuals make up the same group that would
likely benefit most from Internet voting. Young individuals use the Internet
more often than older individuals.48 Therefore, by implementing Internet
voting, a jurisdiction would be making it easier for young members of racial
minorities to vote, countering current legislative trends against youth
voting.
Therefore, because Internet voting would not dilute the voting
power of any racial group; because it may actually work to counter current
racially discriminatory policies based on age; and because it would not, at
least if implemented gradually, have a racially discriminatory effect, it does
not violate Section Two of the Voting Rights Act.

B. Section Five Does Not Prohibit Internet Voting
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act is a complicated area of law
at this time. The Supreme Court has effectively rendered Section Five
inoperable as a result of its decision in Shelby County,49 which held that the
coverage formula contained in Section Four was unconstitutional.50
However, there is still the possibility that Section Five will have fresh teeth
if Congress enacts a new coverage formula, and therefore it is worth
discussing.
The first notable point with regards to Section Five is that it is
unlikely to have any real effect if Section Two is not implicated. Section
Five is meant to preclear certain jurisdictions—to prevent them from
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/05/17/explaining-why-minority-births-nowoutnumber-white-births/.
47
See Josh Israel, STUDY: Voter ID Laws Affect Young Minorities Most,
THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 13, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/03/13/1710
351/study-voter-id-laws-affect-young-minorities-most/ (describing how the “strict
voter ID laws being pushed by Republican state legislators around the country most
impact young people, especially young minorities”).
48
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 43, at 5 (showing that eighty-two percent
of people ages eighteen through thirty-four report accessing the Internet from some
location, while only forty-five and a half percent of those ages sixty-five and older
reported the same).
49
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
50
Id. at 2631. The coverage formula used 40-year-old data that did not reflect what
current statistical evidence would have. Id.
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implementing a law before its constitutionality is checked.51 Therefore, the
entire preceding argument related to Section Two applies equally well here,
because if Internet voting does not violate Section Two then it is unlikely to
be denied under a Section Five preclearance evaluation. The most that
would be expected is the requirement for some further hard data, meaning a
jurisdiction not subject to preclearance would have to implement Internet
voting first in order to generate numbers which would then be used to
evaluate the potential racially discriminatory effect in a jurisdiction subject
to preclearance.
Even beyond this, however, the key thing to examine is not merely
how Internet voting would treat racial minorities, but how Internet voting
would treat racial minorities compared to the current system. This requires
looking at how members of racial minorities currently vote (by travelling to
the polling location) and comparing that to how they could potentially vote
in an Internet voting system (from home, or from a nearby location).
Public transportation is primarily used by people of color.52 In the
nine states covered as a whole by the old formula of Section Four,53 only
one city—Arlington, Virginia—scored over a 50 on a 100-point Transit
Score scale by Walk Score.54 These numbers indicate that physical access to
a polling place is already difficult for racial minorities in the areas that were
covered by the Voting Rights Act. A change to Internet voting might have a
similar impact on individuals within those groups, but it would not likely be
enough to lead to denial of the change, especially if another state had
already tried the new system.
Therefore, because Section Five only prohibits voting schemes
which Section Two would also prohibit, and because a comparative view of
51

52 U.S.C.A. § 10304 (West Supp. 2014); see also Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at
2620 (explaining the operation of Section Five).
52
Amanda Hess, Race, Class, and the Stigma of Riding the Bus in America, THE
ATLANTIC CITIES (Jul. 10, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/commute/
2012/07/race-class-and-stigma-riding-bus-america/2510/ (describing the history of
the interaction between race and public transportation, and noting that seventy-eight
percent of bus riders in Atlanta are black). For comparison, only fifty-four percent
of Atlanta’s total population was black in 2010. State & County QuickFacts:
Atlanta (city), Georgia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/13/1304000.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). This indicates that, at least
in one city previously covered by Section Five of the Voting Rights Act,
Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2014),
black individuals use one method of public transportation at a greater overall rate,
and a greater relative rate, than white individuals.
53
U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., supra note 52.
54
Cities & Neighborhoods, WALK SCORE, http://www.walkscore.com/cities-andneighborhoods/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).

194

INTERNET VOTING POST-SHELBY COUNTY

[Vol. 13

current mass-transit availability with Internet access ability shows that a
switch would not have any more of a discriminatory effect on racial
minorities than the current system does, Section Five of the Voting Rights
Act is unlikely to prevent the adoption of an Internet voting scheme.

CONCLUSION
Internet voting is the future of electoral politics in this country.
While there may be political and policy reasons why Internet voting will be
delayed in coming to fruition, it faces no legal obstacles, either
constitutional or statutory. The constitutional prohibition on poll taxes does
not apply to Internet voting because of the wide range of alternative and
free opportunities to vote that could, and likely would, be implemented. The
statutory Voting Rights Act does not prohibit Internet voting through either
Section Two or Section Five, because Internet voting would not have
racially discriminatory effects. Furthermore, it is not prohibited by Section
Five because it would be no worse than the current racially discriminatory
system, which requires the use of public transportation. And because
Section Five has been rendered inoperable by Shelby Cnty., now is the
perfect time for those states that previously would have had to have faced
that hurdle to experiment. Internet voting is therefore perfectly legal, and
should be implemented, barring political and policy concerns.

